Institute of Governance > Online Articles & Papers, by Author > Online Articles & Papers, by Date Published Online > Article: A NEW PARLIAMENT AND SCOTLAND'S FUTURE - Questions and Answers on a Scottish Parliament by Alice Brown and David McCrone |
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A NEW PARLIAMENT AND SCOTLAND'S FUTURE
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In this lecture, we want to set Scotland's new parliament in context. We will divide what we have to say, like Gaul, into three parts. First of all, the historical context. Then we will outline and explain what the new Scottish parliament will do. And finally, we will look, as far as we can, into the future. All these parts are essential. If we ignore the history, or treat it as if there actually is no tomorrow, then we will not properly understand this highly significant business of setting up a parliament. All of us are a little bemused that we find ourselves at such a crux in our history. As academics - in our case as social and political scientists - let us try and make sense of it together. You may be wondering how we are going to do this as a duo. We will not
sing together, either in unison or descant. So that you do not
get too bored with us, we will take in turns to ask questions of the
other. Of course, we will not answer all the ones you have come along
with. This lecture has been advertised as a debate, after all. We will
rely on you, our knowledgeable audience, to raise the questions at the
end if we miss any. A: No-one can deny that money changed hands, or that the Duke of Hamilton had toothache (allegedly) on the day of the final 'Protest' which had helped to draw the treaty up was presented. However, the fact that the Union took and held suggests that whatever the immediate reasons, it came to be a stable Union which adapted to the changing conditions. The point about the Union was that in many ways Scotland had the best of both worlds: access to economic/political influence, as well as retaining and developing its 'civil society' - its autonomous systems of law, education and religion, and its local administration (including its money system).
Q: SCOTLAND DIDN'T BECOME A COLONY OF ENGLAND THEN? A: no - that's an argument hard to sustain, given that the Scots remained in control of their day-to-day affairs. If we look at Ireland and Wales, on the other hand, we can see evidence of English (and British) colonialism. it's hard to make an argument that the Scots were oppressed. Rather, they were oppressors of other people, notably in the British Empire - 'junior partners' is how Tom Nairn described them in the imperial enterprise. This is not of course to say that everyone did well out of the Union. There was considerable regional oppression (notably in the Highlands) as well as social class inequalities. Scots oppressed Scots. Only at the time of the '45 did the British government act unilaterally without consulting its Scottish ministers. By and large, however, there was little widespread agitation for Scotland
to leave the Union, or to reform it so that Scotland had a domestic parliament
or assembly. One might ask Q: SO WHY CAN'T THE UNION CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT FORM? A: Remember our metaphor - that the Union was a marriage of convenience.
In other words, it wasn't the result of conquest by England of Scotland;
or - if we keep the marriage metaphor for the moment - because the Scots
and English fell in love with each other and became Mr and Mrs Britain.
They lived in the same house because - and as long as - it suited them. Q: SO WHY DOESN'T IT APPEAR TO SUIT THE SCOTS? A: Remember it's a matter of conditions: Britain was the largest and
most powerful state in the world from about the mid-18th to late 19th
century. The Scots undoubtedly had influence well beyond what they would
have had on their own. In other words, the Empire was hugely important
to Scots - it provided markets, jobs in administering it, power, money
and status way beyond their expectations. Scots also exported their culture
through the Empire too, notably their principles of meritocratic education,
and what Thomas Carlyle called 'Scottish Puritanism'. Q: WHAT HAS CHANGED? WHY IS THE 'MARRIAGE' NO LONGER CONVENIENT'? A: It's a complex play of different forces. First of all, there's the loss of British economic and political power, the end of Empire. This is not enough of itself, but it set the backdrop for events of the 20th century, especially in the second half. That's the background theme, if you like. Secondly, as the UK became (slowly) democratic - remember it had been
forged, to use Linda Colley's nicely ambiguous expression - the state
was more and more involved in social and economic affairs. This took
a long time to happen in what was classic laissez-faire territory, but
happen it did, especially as the UK had to follow the lead of the more
'developmentalist' states like Germany and the USA in the late 19th century. Q: SO BRITAIN BECAME MORE CENTRALISED. DIDN'T THE SCOTS OBJECT? A: They did when it mattered, and to people who were unionist in their politics too: think of Walter Scott's objection to currency changes which eroded the Scottish bank note. At the same time, the Scottish Office was formally constituted in the 1880s so that Scotland could be run more efficiently. This was largely done in the interests of technically efficient government, but we should not lose sight of the fact that there was a considerable degree of 'national identity' bound up in this too. After all, it was never seriously contested that the framework for efficient government was a Scottish one. A: Yes - It's more difficult for us these days to appreciate that one could be a unionist and a nationalist too, that is, to be proudly Scottish, and yet take the view that this enabled one to be British (i.e. not English) too. We will see later that matters of identity are still complex in this country of ours. The key question of course is why didn't this hold? A: There was a basic contradiction built into the British state which became more and more a point of tension: the UK was a 'unitary' state (some have called it a 'union' state, but the key point was that there was a single legislature). At the same time, a considerable amount of administration remained in Scotland - remember the institutions of civil society - and these became more powerful and significant as time went on. Until the 1950s at least, any legislation which Scottish MPs agreed on was virtually accepted, except, of course, constitutional matters like Home Rule. There was always the potential for tension between London administration and Edinburgh administration, and this grew more obvious as time went on. A: The Second World War was the watershed. At one level, it strengthened
the Union immeasurably. Wars tend to make societies more cohesive, if
only for a time. Tom Johnston, the wartime Secretary of State, had created
a very powerful Scottish Office machine, and successive governments,
Conservative as well as Labour, used it to restructure the Scottish economy
away from the old and declining staple industries. We can begin to talk
of a distinctive and explicit Scottish economic agenda in the public
domain from this point on. This was not because Labour went nationalist
- far from it. That was the point at which Labour backed off Home Rule
in the interests of what was called in those days 'democratic centralism'. Q: BUT WHAT OF THE CONSERVATIVES? WERE THEY PLAYING A NATIONALIST CARD? A: Up to a point. The Tories were not above claiming that the post-war
Labour government was anti-Scottish because it centralised power on London,
including the nationalised industries. The Tories were also far more
popular in Scotland in those days, not simply because they played the
Scottish card, but - probably more importantly - they had captured a
significant section of the Protestant working class in Scotland. They
were the only party in Scotland since the war to win 50% of the popular
vote - in 1955 - in alliance with the Liberal Unionists. Q: SO WHAT WENT WRONG FOR THE CONSERVATIVES? A: Put simply, they failed to renew themselves. They lost the working class vote as religion lost its power in politics and the welfare state grew in importance. They failed to capture people who were moving away from their old communities in post-war Scotland, both in geographical terms - to the New Towns, for example - and in social terms - as people became more socially mobile out of the working class. By and large, these were the people who in England went Tory, or at least Liberal from the late 1950s onwards. But Q: WHY SHOULD THIS MATTER IN SCOTLAND? A: Because in a unitary state, the political will of the majority was
always going to lie with how England voted. That's not unreasonable;
the English are 85% of the UK population. The problem was majoritarian
democracy. It didn't matter for a while, because Scotland and England
voted for the same parties in the same strength once the universal franchise
was introduced, until the 1950s when it all began to change. Since then,
there has been a growing gap in party fortunes north and south of the
border. Q: BUT DIDN'T THIS SIMPLY MEAN THAT SCOTS VOTED LABOUR? A: Only up to a point. The divergence between Scotland and England is only partly explained by the success of Labour in Scotland (or rather, its non-success in England). The other parties - obviously the SNP, but also the Liberals (later, Liberal-Democrats) - were on-hand to ensure that Labour did not have it all its own way. After all, Labour has never won a majority of votes in Scotland. The fact that they capture majorities of seats is a quirk of the first-past-the-post electoral system. A: The SNP were in the right place at the right time. It was no coincidence that North Sea Oil came on-stream along with the SNP. Remember: the Scots had entered the Union for largely economic reasons. There was always a sense that they were much better off inside the Union - until Oil came along. Whatever the merits and demerits in economic terms, Oil had one massive impact on political psychology. It allowed the Scots to imagine an Independent Scotland. Hence, the classic slogan: It's Scotland's Oil'. It wasn't - in legal terms, but this was a political-moral argument, and Oil helped to remove a key obstacle for those arguing for Independence. The key appeal of the SNP in the 1970s was to the mobile Scottish voter
- who were moving out of old Scotland into new skilled jobs and into
new kinds of communities. Q: YES, BUT THE SNP ROSE AND FELL VERY QUICKLY IN THE 1970S, DIDN'T IT? A: yes - their 11 MPs in 1974 were reduced to a mere 2 in 1979, and their vote virtually halved. This of course was the election when Mrs Thatcher came to power on a platform of rolling back the state, and on a base of southern English votes. The problem for her party was that the 'state' which was being downsized in Scotland was the Scottish state - or rather the public sector which had played a crucial part not simply in providing jobs directly but in restructuring the economy, most obviously by attracting inward investment. It was St Andrews House and the local state in Scotland which had helped to transform the economy, and which had built up a strong symbiosis with private business. This seems to imply that MRS THATCHER WAS TO BLAME? A: It depends what for. She certainly had little understanding that Scotland was a different part of the kingdom. We did things differently here. Her party in Scotland was much weakened, and had failed to adjust to the new Scotland. Hence her message didn't take in Scotland because there was little or no indigenous fertile soil. She thought that Adam Smith was, in her words, 'a jolly good Scot', but she failed to understand the Scots, and they her. Her coup de théâtre was the Sermon on the Mound when in 1988 she lectured the Kirk on her views of the gospel. This proved not to be a meeting of minds. On the other hand, the demand for a Scottish parliament was not her
doing. It began long before Mrs Thatcher came on the scene. She was,
however, a catalyst, the unwitting midwife of Scottish Home Rule. Q: HOW COME? A: Well, her own power base was southern English. She spoke the language
of much of middle England. She was what she was. But it didn't play well
in Scotland, or Wales for that matter. And it didn't have to. Scotland
and Wales only counted for 15% of the British electorate. Symbolism matters
a lot in politics. Take the Poll Tax. Most people believe that Scotland
was used as a testing ground. Well, it wasn't. The Scottish Tories actually
pleaded with her to introduce it as a replacement for the rates in Scotland,
which had been re-valued in the 1980s. She simply gave them what they
wanted. It didn't do her or them any good at all in electoral terms.
By 1987, the Conservatives were down to less than a quarter of the vote,
and couldn't even field the proverbial football team (five-a-side though
was becoming a possibility). It became plain that no matter how Scotland
voted, it was going to get a government elected by someone else. That's
when the 'democratic deficit' became part of the language of Scottish
politics. Q: ALL THIS IS TO IMPLY THAT IT WAS DOWN TO MRS THATCHER. HADN'T DEVOLUTION BEEN DEFEATED IN THE REFERENDUM IN 1979? AND SURELY THE OPPOSITION WAS DIVIDED? A: yes and no. In 1979 a majority (52%) of Scots voted yes. To be sure,
it wasn't enough to meet the 40% rule which had been forced on the dying
Labour government by those hostile to what was then to be a Scottish
assembly. After all, if you'd not voted - or even if you were dead -
you were counted as a 'no' voter. When Labour fell in 1979, so the Scotland
Act effectively fell with it. The incoming Conservative government passed
an explicit resolution to repeal the Act. Labour and the SNP both felt
betrayed by each other (and the electorate) in 1979, and went into their
respective political wildernesses for a time. Q: SO FACED WITH SUCH AN ENGLISH GOVERNMENT HEADED BY SUCH AN ENGLISH LEADER AS MRS THATCHER, WHY DIDN'T THE SNP SWEEP THE BOARD? A: In the new class politics of the 1980s, Labour was in better ideological
shape to provide the opposition in Scotland. They were (re)converted
to Home Rule by a trick of political fate. An all-party convention -
the Scottish Constitutional Convention - was set up to take devolution
forward. All parties were invited: the Tories had no truck with it. After
all, they were the masters now. The SNP came - and went. They voted to
pursue a more fundamentalist line of Independence nothing less. They
had been burned by the 1979 debacle, and supporting someone else's policy.
This turned out to Labour's advantage. SCC allowed Labour to convert
itself back into a Home Rule party. Its MPs (minus the West Lothian One)
signed the Claim of Right which asserted that the Scottish people had
the right to choose their own constitution. The stage was set for a new
kind of politics. After an electoral false start in 1992, the coup
de grace came in May 1997. For the first time since the 1832 reform
Act, there were no Tory MPs in Scotland. There was to be a Scottish parliament,
but not until after a referendum. One might be tempted to say that Q: WE'VE BEEN HERE BEFORE - IN 1979. WHY ANOTHER REFERENDUM? A: A good question. When the Labour party announced that it would hold a referendum if elected, many Home Rulers were highly sceptical that it might lead to a re-run of 1979. It turned out to be an astute move on Labour's part. First, it stopped the campaign by the-then Secretary of State Michael Forsyth who had made the play with the 'tartan tax', that a Scottish parliament would inevitably lead to higher taxes, and that this would be unpopular. Second, Labour wanted to have a clear and independent mandate for a parliament - which a referendum would give - to clear the passage through both houses of parliament at Westminster. They too remembered the lessons of 1979 when the government and its devolution bill were dragged down to defeat together. This was an important legacy of the late John Smith who had piloted the 1979 Scotland Bill through parliament, and who favoured a referendum as a means of reflecting, in his words, the settled will of the Scottish people. This time the government had issued its white paper within 2 months of its election. The paper became a best seller. The campaign itself found Labour, Liberal Democrats and the SNP - who
under Alex Salmond had ditched its fundamentalist stance over devolution
- running in harness to the discomfiture of the No campaign which was
hobbled by a defeated and demoralised Conservative party. Q: WERE THE GOVERNMENT SURPRISED AT THE RESULT? A: I think they were. On the night of the referendum count, and before the results were announced, there was a fair degree of gloom in the foyer of the Edinburgh Conference centre, if not about the outcome on question 1 - do you think there should be a Scottish parliament - but on the second - tax-varying question, and especially about the turnout. Pessimism was overdone. There was 3 to 1 support for the principle of a parliament; 2 to 1 on question 2; and a 60% turnout, which, given a fairly elderly electoral register was roughly equivalent to 67% on an up-to-date register. As far as referendum turnouts go, this was very respectable. Surveys such as the Scottish Referendum Study indicate that voters are far more interested in what a Scottish parliament is likely to do than the one at Westminster. The government moved quickly to push through its bill before Christmas.
Clause 1(1) said simply : 'there shall be a Scottish parliament'. Q: SO WHAT WILL THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT DO? WHAT POWERS WILL IT HAVE? AND WHAT WILL WESTMINSTER BE RESPONSIBLE FOR? A: Basically, anything not stipulated in the powers reserved to Westminster are devolved to the Scottish parliament. This is the reverse of what was proposed for the Scottish assembly in 1979. So let's start with the areas of responsibility remaining with London: Reserved Powers: The Constitution of the UK
Edinburgh will have the following responsibilities: Powers of the Scottish Parliament: All areas not reserved including: Health
Q: ISN'T THIS A RECIPE FOR CONFLICT? HOW CAN YOU DIVIDE UP POWERS IN THIS WAY? A: Well, many other countries do. After all, federal systems are based
on a division of governmental responsibilities. Q: YES, BUT THIS ISN'T FEDERALISM, IS IT? A: not if you mean, federalism as in the USA or Germany, where each
state or land has similar powers. That's symmetrical federalism. There
is of course also asymmetrical federalism. In Spain, for example - which
describes itself as a 'state of the autonomies' - the historic nations
- Catalonia, Euzkadi - the Basque Country, and Galicia, all have more
powers than the regions of Spain. The system seems to work pretty well. Q: SO WHY NOT FEDERALISM HERE? A: Well, in a sense that's what is happening, with assemblies in Wales and in Northern Ireland, and a law-making parliament in Scotland. It's asymmetrical, of course, but it's open to the English regions to push for greater regional autonomy. If you mean symmetrical federalism, then there are two related problems: England is far too big to be a unit on its own - 85% of the UK population live there; and secondly, you can't carve England up easily into regions, or wait for them to generate their own demand. That simply isn't feasible. Of course, this still leaves the question: A: Because it has always been a nation within the British state, not a region. It's back to our marriage of convenience analogy again. Scotland was one of the two founding partners of Great Britain, and has always had a substantial - and growing - amount of devolution since 1707. It was of course administrative rather than political devolution. Another reason is that Scotland has had separate legislation dating back to the time of the Union itself. In many ways, setting up a parliament simply makes directly and democratically accountable what the Scottish Office already controls. Scotland also has its own legal system which the Principality does not have, although the Province will be able to make primary legislation. A: If they want them in due course, why shouldn't they have them? Devolving
power in this way is not a zero-sum game in which if Scotland gets more
power, then other nations and regions can't have it. It's a matter of
political demand. For example, the demand for devolution in Wales was
always lower than in Scotland, and the government had to make a fine
judgement about how much and how little to devolve to a Welsh assembly
to maximise the support in their referendum. If it offered too much devolution,
then some people would have voted no; while if it offered less devolution,
others would have voted no - what is called the revolving door problem.
You've got to judge the right balance so as to maximise those inside,
i.e. voting in favour, for whatever reasons. As we know, in Wales, it
was close-run thing. Q: WON'T A SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INEVITABLY GENERATE CONFLICT WITH WESTMINSTER? A: Nothing is inevitable in politics, but conflict - conducted openly and sensibly - is the stuff of politics. Who gets what will have to be seriously debated and decided on. Blaming someone else - like Westminster for your problems - doesn't do you or the system much good. There are of course potential sharp edges: Social security, for example, is a reserved power, but housing benefit is devolved. How this will work out in practice will be worth watching, especially if the government carries out its intention to reform the welfare system. We might see, for example, territorial variations in levels of benefit to fit in with variations in wage rates and house prices. Similarly, macro-economic policy is retained at Westminster, but it's a moot point who actually runs economies in these days of global markets. The use of high interest rates to cool down the economy of certain parts of the UK while other parts are feeling the cold is another potential area to watch. We're already seeing complaints from some regions like the North of England about the adverse trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Broadcasting is another sphere which has become much more salient recently.
Should, for example, there be an opt-out in television news in Scotland,
and should BBC Scotland have more devolved power? That is a question
which many Scottish 'branches' of UK organisations are asking themselves
in the context of a parliament. And of course, the Scottish parliament
is expected to debate all matters pertaining to Scotland, including ones
reserved to Westminster. One key issue, of course, is money: Q: HOW WILL THE PARLIAMENT BE FUNDED? A: Basically through the existing block grant which is based on what
is called the Barnett formula. This means there is a budget of about £15bn.
The parliament will also have the power to increase or decrease the basic
rate of income tax set by the UK Parliament by a maximum of 3p in the £.
This means that it has the power to decide on the distribution of the £l5bn
assigned budget between its different areas of responsibility. It can
decide to target any additional funds towards specific projects. Q: WON'T THE VOTING SYSTEM FOR A SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT ADD TO THESE COMPLICATIONS? A: Let's outline what the voting system actually involves:
(i) for a constituency MSP
Q: WHAT IS LIKELY TO BE THE OUTCOME IN POLITICAL TERMS? A: It's highly unlikely that any party will have an overall majority. This will of course affect the traditional domination of Labour in Scotland. Remember, though, that this domination is in terms of seats not votes. For example, at the 1997 election Labour won 78% of the seats in Scotland, but on 46% of the vote. Donald Dewar has acknowledged the likely outcome: writing in our journal Scottish Affairs, he said: 'The changes to the electoral system are by any standards brave and, indeed, some of my less charitable party colleagues regard the proportional electoral system as a form of charitable giving almost without precedent in Scottish politics.' (Dewar, special issue of Scottish Affairs, 1998:9) Labour is likely to be the biggest party, but not to have an overall majority. Any party needs to win 65 seats to do so. A coalition government is likely, probably between Labour and the Liberal-Democrats, their partners in the Scottish Constitutional Convention in the 1980s and 1990s. A: Not necessarily, in two senses. First of all, survey and opinion
poll evidence suggests that the electorate are likely to distinguish
between elections for Westminster and elections for Holyrood. Labour
is well ahead of the SNP in Westminster elections (by as much as 15 to
20 percentage points), but it's likely to be much closer in elections
for the Scottish parliament. Recent polls put Labour and the SNP neck-and-neck
on both the first-past-the-post vote, and on the list vote. Given Labour's
lead in the first vote, they're likely to end up as the largest party,
winning about 50-55 seats to the SNP's 45-50. We shouldn't be surprised
at this differential between London and Edinburgh votes. After all, in
autonomous elections in Catalunya, the nationalists take about 40% of
the vote to the Socialists' 25%. The vote shares are virtually reversed
in elections for the all-Spanish Cortes. Q: YOU SAID THERE WAS A SECOND REASON WHY PEOPLE MIGHT VOTE DIFFERENTLY. A: Having two votes rather than one adds to the fun and unpredictability.
The 1997 elections study and the Scottish referendum study suggest as
many as one-third of the electorate will split their votes for different
parties. Where this really matters is in what Labour and SNP voters do.
For example, about two-thirds of Labour voters give the SNP as their
second choice, and two-thirds of SNP voters reciprocate. Q: WHY SHOULD THAT BE? AREN'T THEY SWORN ENEMIES? A: It depends what you mean. Labour is in favour of devolution, and
the SNP want Independence. However, our analysis of voting behaviour
and attitudes is that both parties are left-of-centre, and competing
for roughly the same kind of votes, which in Scotland are the majority.
Labour and SNP sympathisers are almost identically left-of-centre on
almost all issues. The much smaller Conservative pool of voters (only
17% gave the Tories as their first or their second choice, compared with
56% for Labour, and 41% for the SNP) is firmly right-wing. The Liberal-Democrats
who 29% of the electorate give as their first or second choices are somewhere
in between, but closer to Labour and the SNP than the Tories. Q; SO WHAT WILL INFLUENCE HOW PEOPLE VOTE IN MAY NEXT YEAR? A: We have two useful pieces of evidence; the study carried out after
the May 1997 election, and a similar one after the Referendum vote in
September. Both suggest that the electorate is likely to be influenced
by three main factors. The most influential was who people trusted to
work in Scotland's interests. The Tories did very badly on this, and
the SNP did well. The second influence was what people wanted the parliament
to do by way of policies. The Scottish electorate is somewhat more left-of-centre
than elsewhere in Britain, so whichever party catches this mood is likely
to do well. Third, and this may surprise some people, attitudes to Independence.
To say that, of course, raises a key question: Q: ISN'T THIS A DEVOLVED PARLIAMENT? WHAT HAS INDEPENDENCE TO DO WITH IT? A: True, but the electorate doesn't seem to make the clear-cut distinctions
implied in that question. For example, people have strong expectations
about the democratic effectiveness of the Scottish parliament, and they
are optimistic that the parliament will give ordinary people more say
in how Scotland is governed, a stronger voice in the UK, and a stronger
voice in Europe. Attitudes to Independence will become a key issue in
Scottish politics. About four in ten voters say they want Independence.
This is not a majority, of course, but about 60% of Scots, regardless
of what they prefer, expect Independence to come about within 20 years.
This means it's not unthinkable for most people. Q: I'M NOT SURE YOU'VE ANSWERED MY QUESTION. WHAT'S INDEPENDENCE TO DO WITH IT? A: Well, supporters of Independence can have it both ways. If the devolved
parliament works, that is, people think it is meeting their expectations,
then they can claim that it proves that Scots can run their own affairs,
and would like to do more. If, on the other hand, the parliament doesn't
have the expected impact, then they can argue that's because it doesn't
have sufficient powers, something only Independence will bring. Q: SO IT SOUNDS LIKE THOSE PEOPLE WHO SAID THAT DEVOLUTION IS THE SLIPPERY SLOPE WERE RIGHT? A: No. Nothing is inevitable in politics, and there's all to play for. It's up to the electorate to decide whether or not Independence happens. It cannot simply be kept off the political agenda. Let's look at the scenarios. It is true that if the SNP can mobilise policy preferences coupled with the lack of deep hostility to Independence, they would be in a position to make considerable electoral progress. One of the crucial findings of our analysis is that Scots differ on policy from the rest of Britain precisely on those matters reserved to Westminster - social security, economic policy. Education is actually the policy area in which the Scots differ most from the rest of Britain. That is, of course, a devolved power. If the government fails to make progress on poverty and improving the economy, then the SNP is in a strong position. They've still got to get over the hurdle of proportional representation to win power. And if and when they do, they've to convince the electorate in a referendum to vote for Independence. A: Of course. Labour is Scotland's biggest party, with an enormous presence
in all aspects of Scottish life. The present electoral system may exaggerate
its support in elections, but Labour is a central part of the social-democratic
consensus in Scotland, and has been at it much longer than the SNP. Its
task will be to evolve an independent stance from London, to become a
genuinely Scottish Labour party, something it's been able to fudge up
till now. That means being willing to argue the Scottish case even when
the British Labour party thinks something else. That's not impossible.
The Socialist party in Spain and Catalunya encounter that all the time.
It'll also be up to the Liberal-Democrats, their likely coalition partners,
to keep Labour honest. Q: YOU'VE NOT MENTIONED THE CONSERVATIVES. ARE THEY IRRELEVANT NOW? A: You can never write off what is the oldest political party in Scotland. It is in some disarray however. It remains in the ghetto into which it retreated since the 1950s. Being in power for 18 years from 1979 until 1997 was extremely bad for Scottish Conservatism. It had no independent mandate north of the border. It had power, if you like, but not support. They have three problems now in Scotland. First, they only appeal to a small minority of firmly right-wing opinion. The other parties in Scotland are much more in touch with the political values and policy preferences of the Scots. Second, they are perceived as not standing up for Scotland's interests. Over 90% of non-Conservative identifiers expected them to work in Scotland's interests 'only some of the time' or 'almost never'. They are perceived as an anti-Scottish party. Finally, they are saddled with the legacy of a parliament they vehemently opposed. While the Scottish party is learning to live with, if not love, devolution, there are elements south of the border - associated with English nationalism - who are much more hostile. This raises what seems to many people to be a basic worry: Q: ISN'T NATIONALISM OF ANY SORT - ENGLISH OR SCOTTISH - SIMPLY BASED ON ETHNIC RIVALRY, EVEN HATRED? WON'T A SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT SIMPLY OPEN THAT CAN OF WORMS? A: I think there are a number of misunderstandings about. Let's touch
on the English nationalism issue first. Englishness is a very curious
and unusual creature insofar as it's highly implicit, and usually confused
with being British. National identities - or nation-ness- usually needs
an 'other' against which it can identify itself. I doubt if Scotland
is an 'other' for England in any strong way. We're neither big enough
or important enough to matter. I think you'd have to look to continental
Europe - to France and/or Germany - for that. Secondly, there is plenty
of evidence that people in England are not hostile to devolution for
Scotland. I guess you'd describe their position as mildly supportive
-to-neutral. Q: OK. BUT ISN'T ENGLAND THE 'OTHER' FOR US? WON'T THE PARLIAMENT STIR UP ETHNIC ANTI-ENGLISHNESS? A: Without wishing to sound complacent, I doubt that very much. Let's
look at evidence again. While sections of the media have been working
hard at finding evidence for anti-Englishness, it's a bit of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. We can find little evidence either in attitudes or behaviour
that this is on the increase. One might even say that having an electoral
system whereby Scotland had a democratic deficit for 18 years was much
more likely to create anti-Englishness. We've also got much firmer evidence from our studies. Why did people
vote for a Scottish parliament? Well, you might say, because they were
expressing their ethnic Scottishness. Sorry. Plausible but wrong. National
identity played a very minor role in how people voted last September.
For example, 72% of people who identified themselves as Scottish voted
'yes'. So did 63% of those who identified themselves as British. The
support for a Scottish parliament was so widespread that clear majorities
were found in all social groups: women as well as men; working class
and middle class people; the old as well as the young; Catholics as well
as Protestants, and so on. Q: SO IF IT'S NOT AN ETHNIC EXPRESSION, WHAT IS IT? A: In a sentence: people in Scotland voted for a parliament because they expect it to improve their lives. Your social position, your national identity, played only a small role in whether people want a parliament or not. That's why, incidentally, people also voted for the parliament to have tax-varying powers. Most people expect taxes to rise, but that made little difference to how they voted last September. They did so because they expected higher taxes to be spent wisely on welfare and social benefits, and in particular in improving the economy, unemployment, education, the NHS, and so on. In other words, people seem to be operating an agenda based on 'civic' rather than 'ethnic' dimensions. It's less a mater of birth and ancestry, more a matter of residence and commitment. It's important to underline this point. We've mentioned the fact that
there is a social-democratic consensus in Scotland. True, it's not that
different from elsewhere in Britain, but Scots have more left-of-centre
values, and more left-of-centre policy preferences than the rest of Britain.
In particular, they are much more in favour of comprehensive schools,
more in favour of wealth distribution, and more in favour of paying taxes
to pay for better services. In sum, Scotland is more socialist, more
liberal, and less British-national than the rest of Britain. Q: YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE SCOTS HAVE CEASED TO BE BRITISH? A: Not at all. I said less British. It is true that people in
Scotland are more likely to say they are Scottish than British (42% to
36%), and that they give priority to being Scottish. Nevertheless, they
continue to have dual identity; about 70% of Scots include being 'British'
as part of their nationality. Of course, people will use 'Scottish' and
'British' depending on the context they find themselves in and what they
think is the appropriate frame. For example, when we asked people to
describe their nationality in the referendum study, 33% said they were
Scottish not British. This compared with 23% earlier in the year when
we carried out the election study. It's likely that because the referendum
was a 'Scottish' event, 'Scottishness' was more salient than in the context
of a British election. In other words, people are quite sophisticated
about using identity labels in different settings. The point remains,
however, that being Scottish rather than being British has the edge these
days. One might ask, of course, Q: WHERE IS ALL THIS LEADING? IS DEVOLUTION A STEPPING-STONE TO INDEPENDENCE AS THE SNP HOPE? OR IS THIS THE END OF THE ROAD? A: You'd need a crystal ball for that. Let's explore the options before
we end. There are only two nowadays. The old status quo - of not having
a parliament of any sort apart from Westminster - is no longer an option.
I notice in your question that you used the word 'devolution'. Strictly
speaking, of course, that means the 'devolving' of power and responsibilities.
I may ask you to carry out my wishes, but they're my wishes. That's devolution.
Enoch Powell once said that power devolved was power retained. By that
he meant that ultimate responsibility - sovereignty if you like - remained
at Westminster. That, I think, is what I think the prime minister has
in mind. Power remains with him - as a British MP (he said English, I
think he meant British). Q: SO WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE? A: The term Home Rule has been about since the Liberals tried to introduce
it to Ireland in the 1880s. They were defeated in their attempt by intransigent
Unionists, and the rest became history. In many ways, however, the term
has lived on. It is of course ambiguous - it can mean devolution in the
sense we've used it - as well as self-government, another ambiguous term.
It has even been used for full Independence. Q: ISN'T THAT SLOPPY THINKING? A: Only if you think these matters are cut-and-dried in real political
life. The point is that they are not. It's best to see this whole business
as a process, not an event. Home Rule can stretch from devolution narrowly
conceived through to autonomy through to formal Independence. It's a
continuum of power. After all, there's a third player on this stage -
the European Union- yes, another union. Who can tell where we'll end
up in the variable geometry of power in the next century? Q: SO HOW LONG WILL ALL THIS TAKE? A: One is tempted to reply, as long as it takes. Remember the metaphor
we used at the outset - the marriage of convenience. Scotland's place
in the Union since 1707 is a very important part of our history. We'd
be utterly wrong to deny that. Its great strength has been in its capacity
to adapt to changing circumstances. The Union - the one with England,
Wales and Northern Ireland - is not the one we entered in 1707. This
Union will hold for the Scots if - and as long as - there is continuing
advantage in it. The new parliament is a major new adaptation to the
economic, political and social conditions at the end of the late 20th
century. One might expect that it gives the British Union (which of course
finds itself within the European Union) a new lease of life. Historians
tell us that the only union acceptable to the Scots in 1707 was the one
which gave them control over their social institutions, their civil society.
That remains even more true today. Q: SHOULDN'T WE BE LOOKING FORWARD RATHER THAN BACKWARD? A: Indeed. But unless we learn from the past, we are likely to repeat its mistakes. The point is that we are likely to be living in much more messy world constitutionally speaking than the one we have inherited. Political sovereignty isn't a zero-sum game anymore - if it ever was. Of course, Scotland has confronted this issue since it entered the British Union in 1707. A new parliament is likely to highlight these issues of sovereignty and accountability in a new - but not inevitable - way. We've got to get used to sharing powers at different levels, and in the Scottish case, that will involve a debate about the interrelationships between the Scottish (national), British (state), and European (supra-state) levels. How the chips fall in due course remains to be seen. What is clear, that with a new parliament opening next year, 1999, Scottish politics will never be the same again.
(Published Online: 30 January 2002)
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