Institute of Governance > Online Articles & Papers, by Author > Online Articles & Papers, by Date Published Online > Article: Marking the Card: The Scottish Parliament at 1000 Days by David McCrone |
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Marking the Card:
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In reviewing the first 1000 days of the Scottish Parliament, it is necessary to put it in long-term context. The first thing to be said is that 'devolution' in the UK looks like a haphazard system, because there is no alternative. There is in no grand design, because none is possible. None is possible, in essence, because the dynamics and trajectories of the three non-English territories of the UK (containing some 9 million people) are quite different, to say nothing of the micro-politics relating to the English regions which dance to a different tune. Scotland has a strong sense of itself as a founding partner in the British state by the Treaty of Union in 1707. It was at no point in its history a colony of England, but entered the Union, at the time plainly against the will of its people who had no say in the matter, as a power trade-off: access to economic markets in England and its territories, in exchange for consolidating England's northern frontier against foreign - mainly French - intrusion. The Union was, by any account, a marriage of convenience between the two sovereign nations, a 'mariage de raison' in the language of Scotland's oldest and former ally (McCrone, 2001). The price of this marriage was a Union with a contradiction at its heart. What began as Great Britain and was later formalised as the United Kingdom was, post-1707, a unitary state with a single legislature, but was in essence, multi-national (MacCormick, 1998). To be sure, to English constitutional theorists like AV Dicey, it was an incorporating union, the extension of England by any other name (and means). To the Scots, on the other hand, it was a quasi-federal arrangement, with autonomy over the institutions which mattered in the governance of Scotland - law, education, religion, local burgh politics, its money system - remaining firmly in Scottish hands. When England proposed to abolish the right of Scotland's commercial banks to issue their own banknotes, no less than a Tory - Walter Scott - rallied the nation to oppose it, and successfully. The implications of what Neil MacCormick has called the Scottish anomaly, namely, that the northern kingdom retained considerable control over its governance until, ironically, the extension of democracy gave power to the English majority, did not begin to unravel until well into the 20th century. Things might have been different if Ireland had been granted, and accepted, Home Rule (a prelude to Home Rule all round), but this was not to be. Not until Mrs Thatcher's rule in the 1980s did the contradiction begin to unravel. With the election of Tony Blair in 1997, the logjam began to shift. The term 'devolution' might be the one London prefers (and it suits its centrist mentalité) but that is to imply that power is delegated, thereby retained. The old Liberal term Home Rule is, in Scotland's case, nearer the mark, for it implies an extension of what was already a considerable system of self-government, but one which required a legislature to stabilise it. In short, recovering a parliament in 1997 was for the Scots, at the same time a large, but also a small step. Events, events...No-one can doubt that the period since 1997 has been a hectic and unpredictable time. Harold Macmillan who was British Prime Minister forty years ago once presciently remarked that what affected politics most were 'events, dear boy, events'. Certainly, there has been no shortage of 'events' in the short life of the parliament. It is now into its third First Minister, perhaps recalling Lady Bracknell's comment that to lose one is misfortune (and the untimely loss of Donald Dewar was certainly that) but to lose two seems like carelessness. The resignation of Henry McLeish was surely avoidable, but in the goldfish bowl of Scottish politics, even the smallest mistakes or errors of judgement are punished severely. It is always a risky business to predict the future, so let us begin by reviewing events since 1999. It seemed at the time, and based on the opinion polls, that Labour would win between 50-55 seats, and the SNP 45-50. In the event, Labour won 56 and the SNP 35, but we were fairly certain that a Labour/Lib-Dem coalition was the most likely outcome, and so it proved. What none of us predicted was that the small Scottish Socialist Party and the Scottish Greens would have a small but articulate presence, nor that Dennis Canavan would trounce Labour in Falkirk West. All in all, we got the kind of government we expected, and once they got the hang of coalition politics, Labour and the Liberal-Democrats worked more or less harmoniously in tandem. There were a few quite public policy disagreements, notably over university tuition fees, causing Labour to instigate an enquiry (chaired by Andrew Cubie), and long-term care for the elderly, but the coalition held tolerably well. There is a well-worn political saw that one's opponents are to be found in other parties, but enemies are in one's own. So, by and large, it proved. All parties had their internal troubles, none more than Labour, where a fair amount of fear and loathing emerged when Henry McLeish resigned, and Jack McConnell took over. Harold Macmillan's 'night of the long knives' seemed like a tea party by comparison, as rivals were dispatched swiftly to the back benches. The JourneyThe first Scottish elections were always likely to produce no party with an overall majority, and so it proved. As the biggest party with 56 seats (43% of the total: significantly above its proportional share of the constituency vote of 39%), Labour was always most likely to link up with the Liberal-Democrats its erstwhile partners in the Constitutional Convention, who won 17 seats. The SNP's strength across Scotland ensured that it would be the second party, but its failure to break into Labour's constituency vote was something of a disappointment to its leaders. The Conservatives, with double irony, benefited from the proportional voting system (which it opposed) by winning all its 18 seats from the list system in a parliament it had fought tooth and nail to defeat. What marked out the parliament as belonging to quite a different family of legislatures than Westminster was the proportion of women MSPs elected - 37% - which put Scotland in the top rank in terms of gender equality. Labour was the most successful in this respect, with 50/50, having set its procedures to produce the desired outcome. The SNP leadership had lost the battle to 'zip' its lists (women and men alternately), but still managed a 43/57 split. The Liberal-Democrats (somewhat to their chagrin), and the Conservatives (who set their face against gender equality from the outset) could only manage 5 women MSPs out of 35 between them. Nevertheless, women's representation in the two biggest parties, Labour and the SNP, ensured that the gender culture of the new parliament was quite different to its Westminster counterpart. The difference between the two parliaments was not simply one of gender, but of procedures and practices. The Consultative Steering Group had produced a set of standing orders and procedures which were deemed more appropriate for a new parliament. It had modern methods of working, and 'family friendly' times of meetings, with recess periods chosen to coincide with Scottish school holidays. Its information service (SPICe) and visitors' centre produced a wide range of materials, accessible in different languages, and using state-of-the-art information technology as a way of enhancing public involvement and information flows. The parliament set up an Equal Opportunities Committee with a commitment to mainstream equal opportunities throughout the work of the parliament. A Civic Forum and a Youth Parliament were also supported by the new parliament as a way of engaging people with politics, as well as a programme for engaging with schools and colleges. By choosing to make its procedures and deliberations transparent, the Scottish Parliament had fashioned a rod for its own back, as a hungry media sought to report, amplify and, on occasion, invent a plethora of stories. The parliament's decision to forego a 'shadowing in' period in favour of the real thing meant that it had to undergo intense press scrutiny of its deliberations on allowances, salaries and housekeeping arrangements, something which was grist to the press in search of a story in a highly competitive newspaper market. Some argued that devolution had conflict with Westminster built in to it, given that in practice devolved and reserved matters ran into each other, especially where money was involved. The fact that many states had devolved powers to sub-state level, and ran their systems quite happily, simply passed much of the media by. The Scottish Parliament has legislative responsibility for all devolved matters and all areas NOT reserved to Westminster. These include: local economic development, health, education and training, housing, transport, law and order, farming, fishing and forestry, the arts, sport, social work services, and local services. The parliament can also discuss and take a view on reserved matters such as defence and foreign policy, European matters, social security benefits, and employment legislation. Establishing the PrinciplesThe Consultative Steering Group had bequeathed to the parliament four principles: power-sharing, accountability, access and participation, and equal opportunities. These principles had emerged out of the long campaign for a Scottish Parliament going back 20 years to the 1979 debacle. More immediately, they had grown out of the lengthy consultation process around the Scottish Constitutional Convention set up in 1989. The strong moral tone in this and other Home Rule documents was a deliberate attempt to establish founding principles which were not based simply on political whim or electoral expedient (Paterson, 1994). What legitimacy, some asked, did an unelected group of private citizens have when it came to designing the principles of a new parliament? Surely that was best left to politicians who better understood the political process? The failure of the political class to deliver devolution in 1979 - remember that a majority of Scots voted yes, but the measure was defeated by a parliamentary gerrymander known as the 40% rule - coupled with the re-election of a Conservative government at Westminster in 1992 with a mere quarter of the popular vote in Scotland, and 11 out of 72 seats, persuaded many in civil society that things could not be left to political parties. To be sure, politicians were included in the various deliberations and commissions over 20 years, but they were usually invited to do so because they had special interests in or sympathies for Home Rule. In short, Scotland's parliament was to be a creation of civil society, and hence a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was inappropriate. Power lay with 'the people', expressed to be sure, through the political process, but the over-arching principle was 'power-sharing'. In the words of the CSG report: 'The Scottish Executive should be accountable to the Scottish Parliament, & the Parliament & the Executive should be accountable to the people of Scotland'. In short, the kind of democracy envisaged was broadly participative rather than narrowly representative. It was of course vital to have directly elected and accountable politicians so as to overcome the 'democratic deficit' whereby Scotland consistently since the 1970s got a government it did not vote for. Nevertheless, it could not be allowed to run to an elected dictatorship; hence, the principles of power-sharing, and accountability; and an electoral system of proportional representation to reflect Scotland's multiple democracy. Parliamentary procedures were designed to allow different channels and opportunities for civic groups, business interests and others to engage with the political process and to allow public views to be heard. Parliament has 17 committees (the work of the Justice Committee turned out to be so great that a second one was created), and their membership reflects the political composition of the parliament, with no single party having a majority. Committees seek evidence from government ministers, civil servants and others, drawing on expert advice, and meeting in different locations - though not as often as many hoped - and above all, are able to initiate legislation. Running through the system was the clear intention of changing the way public policy was developed in Scotland. People distrusted processes of 'consultation' whereby governments decided in private, and then issued its proposals for the public to comment on, with the opportunity merely to tinker at the edges. The new system required a government which had a popular mandate, as well as a deeper, and inevitably longer, system of participation. The argument was that key aspects of policy should not be left to politicians and civil servants, and that at the very least their decisions should be informed by the people who know most about particular policy areas and services including the general public and others in Scottish civil society. Thus, civil society which had organised to help to create the Scottish Parliament articulated their 'right' to influence how the parliament should operate and make decisions about policy. Those with a narrower view of 'politics' argued that this placed too much power in the hands of self-appointed - and unelected - 'experts', and it was deemed contrary to the Scotland Act to have non-MSPs sitting on committees even if they were non-voting members. This vision of a new political system is often encapsulated in the term 'new politics'. Together with a more representative and proportional electoral system, it implies a shift away from a narrow conception of government to a more inclusive notion of 'governance'. It is also based on principles of sovereignty of the people, and on ideas of subsidiarity. This had the potential for a more plural political system with opportunities for different alliances across parties, and opportunities for other sources of advice and voices to be heard in the policy process. Such an approach has clear, and challenging, implications for traditional sources of advice, notably for the role of the civil service; implications too for political actors and policy elites accustomed in pre-devolution Scotland to playing a strong role, and implications for the traditions of an adversarial political system and for the political parties themselves. The OutcomesHow has it all worked out? Having an open and accountable parliament in theory doesn't guarantee it in practice. The features which distinguish it from its Westminster counterpart - the electoral system, fairer representation, the power and role of parliamentary committees, improved working methods, access to proceedings, politicians and information, the use of IT and other opportunities for public participation and involvement provide the potential for greater democracy; they do not in themselves guarantee openness. Barriers to developing a new political culture and democratic system are not totally removed by establishing a new political institution. Certain attitudes persist, political party organisation does not change dramatically, and there is continuity in key relationships, notably in the role of the civil service. In asking how the Parliament has fared so far, one must distinguish between the Parliament itself, which includes all the political parties, and the Executive (there is nervousness about simply calling it a 'government') which is responsible for the policy programme. The relationship between the two is quite different from the one which exists in the House of Commons where the government has a large majority, and stands accused of using the parliament there as a rubber-stamp. In Scotland, the different political actors and interests are learning to live with coalition government, and the balance of power between parties which such a situation implies. It also offers new opportunities for 'unholy alliances' as well as areas for potential conflict. In its first two years, the new Parliament and Executive have had to deal with a number of controversies (listed in Annex: Scottish Parliament: Key Events - opens in new window) including: disputes over the costs of the new Parliament building at Holyrood; the salaries and allowances paid to MSPs, potential splits in the coalition government; and ongoing tensions in the relationships with the House of Commons. Some areas of public policy have aroused heated debate including: tuition fees for students in higher education, funding of long-term care for the elderly, and the repeal of Section 2a of the Local Government Act concerning sex education in schools (its equivalent south of border, Section 28, is still in operation, stymied by the House of Lords). The Executive has been in the firing line on a number of issues such as problems at the Scottish Qualifications Agency (SQA) which resulted in long delays in pupils receiving their examination results in the summer of 2000. In reaching agreement on tuition fees and funding care for the elderly, as well as negotiating a settlement with Scottish teachers over pay and conditions (the McCrone Enquiry), the Scottish Executive is now implementing policy decisions which differ from policy south of the border, an aspect which has raised further constitutional questions about the power of the Scottish Parliament in relation to Westminster, and the way the Parliament is funded. For a new institution, the Scottish Parliament has sustained a considerable number of shocks to the system in its short life. This has not been helped by a hostile media which, having broadly supported the campaign for constitutional reform, lost little time in being one of the Parliament's biggest critics. Losing Donald Dewar, its original First Minister, in October 2000, followed by the resignation of Henry McLeish barely one year later, led some to question whether the whole project would founder as a result. Nevertheless, the official statistics chart the range of policies discussed and the legislation passed by the Parliament: 28 pieces of legislation (and 15 in process by the end of 2001) compared with the one or two Scottish Bills which were normally dealt with per year at Westminster; the number of public petitions and parliamentary questions dealt with, the level of public interest in the new body, and widening of access to politicians and the policy process. Parliamentary committees are acknowledged as a major success story of the Parliament, playing an important role in public policy, and leading the Hansard Society Commission in its report proposing reforms to the House of Commons, to refer to 'inspiration from the Scottish Parliament'. The fact that the leader of the House of Commons is exploring ways of modernising the House along Scottish lines is evidence that others in these islands learn from of good practice. In Scotland, there is clear evidence of greater accountability and visibility of the political process, with the cross-examination of Ministers, civil servants and others. The shift of media focus from Westminster to Holyrood is itself a reflection of the salience of the Parliament in Scottish public life. In the early months of 2001, the Parliament embarked on a comprehensive review, via its Procedures Committee, into 'Whether the key CSG principles as endorsed by the Parliament - sharing power, accountability, accessibility and equal opportunities - are being implemented, to what extent and with what success'. This review is continuing, and has taken evidence from a number of key individuals and organisations, as well as surveying MSPs, parliamentary staff, and the general public through focus groups. What the review is beginning to reveal is that Parliament is thought to be a more accessible institution than the Executive, and that the public finds the term 'Executive' difficult to comprehend, given the confusion between government ministers and civil servants. In addition to this review of CSG principles by the Procedures Committee, Scottish Civic Forum, with funding from the Rowntree Charitable Trust, is conducting its own enquiry to assess the new Parliament, and the extent to which people in Scotland feel more involved in the political system. Assessing the ParliamentHas the Parliament failed? There has been much speculation in the press, frequently uninformed by hard evidence, that the Parliament has failed to live up to the high expectations invested in it by the people of Scotland. Let me review what we know from extensive surveys and opinion polls about how public opinion has changed (Paterson et al., 1999; Curtice et al, 2002). The first thing to be said is that a devolved parliament has become the 'settled will' of the Scottish people. Well over 50% give this as their constitutional preference. Fewer than 1 in 10 would prefer to have no elected parliament at all, suggesting that many of the erstwhile opponents of any form of Home Rule are learning to live with, if not to love, the Scottish Parliament. Table 1: Constitutional Preferences, 1997-2001
Sources: Scottish Referendum Survey, 1997; Has the demand for Independence gone away? Around 30% of people support Independence, marginally down on the figure in 1997, but still a substantial minority of public opinion. There is however a strong body of opinion in Scotland which thinks that the Scottish Parliament should have more powers: at 68% by 2001, compared with 56% in 1999. What is perhaps even more significant is 7 out of 10 of those who want a devolved parliament think it should have more powers, suggesting that 'devolution' and 'independence' resemble points in a continuum of Home Rule, rather than constitutional opposites. Table 2: Constitutional preference and desire for more powers
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999, 2000 and 2001 Where people place themselves depends on what they want the Parliament to achieve in terms of practical policy outcomes, for that is why they wanted a parliament in the first place. In other words, symbolism is far less important than making Scotland a better place to live in, and that remains indubitably what people want from their Parliament. Much has been made in the press of the threat to the UK from devolution. Remember the 'slippery slope' argument, that once people get a taste for devolution, it automatically leads to Independence? Is this happening, or is it too soon to tell? Plainly it is, as we are only just over half-way through the first term of devolved government. Nevertheless, there are some straws in the wind. What about an English backlash? There doesn't seem to be one. People in England seem to be quite happy with devolution for Scotland, and Wales for that matter. The constitutional preferences for Scotland which the English would like to see are almost identical to what the Scots want for themselves, namely, well over half of people in England prefer a devolved Scotland, a quarter want it to be independent, and just 1 in 7 want Scotland to have no parliament at all. It seems, once more, that we should not believe everything we read in the papers. Table 3: Constitutional Preferences in England and Scotland
Sources: for English respondents, British Social Attitudes,
1999; Scots themselves are quite sanguine about the 'slippery slope' argument; indeed, they are far less likely to believe that devolution will lead on to independence than they were in 1997 when over 40% said they thought devolution would make it more likely that Scotland would leave the UK. By 2001, just over a quarter thought it would, roughly balancing the number who thought devolution would make Scotland stay in the Union. The largest number - over 41% - thought it would make no difference. Table 4: 'Which of the following comes closest to your views: ...'
Sources (as table 1): Scottish Referendum Survey, 1997; Certainly, there has been a falling away in the high levels of optimism of 1997 when 7 out of 10 Scots thought that a devolved parliament would give Scotland a stronger voice in the UK, and give them more say in how Scotland is governed. Now barely half think that. 'Realism' seems to have crept back, for by 2000, two-thirds thought that Westminster rather than Holyrood had most influence over the way Scotland is run, rather than the Scottish Parliament. On the other hand, more than 7 people in 10 think that the Scottish Parliament should have most influence, an interesting disparity, reinforcing the finding that people would not be averse to Holyrood having more powers. Table 5: Institution with most influence over the way Scotland is run
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999, 2000 and 2001 (*data based on 2001 survey) In a straight race in the popularity stakes between London and Edinburgh, the Scottish Parliament wins hands down. While around 1 person in 5 thinks that the UK government can be trusted to work in Scotland's long-term interests, 3 out of 5 Scots place greater trust in the Scottish Parliament. In other words, Scots are three times as likely to place their trust in the Scottish Parliament than in the British one. There is no sense here of people in Scotland seeing Holyrood as a 'second-order' parliament, whatever the constitutional niceties of the Scotland Act 1998. Table 6: Trust to work in Scotland's long term interests
Sources (as table 1): Scottish Referendum Survey, 1997; Opinion polls tell a quite similar story. By 2001, the percentage thinking that the Scottish Parliament had achieved 'a lot' had doubled in the previous 6 months from 11% to 25%, and a concomitant halving in the numbers thinking it had achieved 'nothing at all', which had fallen from 29% to 14%. Young people consistently took a more optimistic view of the Scottish Parliament than older people, with twice as many thinking it had most relevance to their lives, and significant numbers wanting it to have a more proactive role in policy-making. This is good news for the Scottish Parliament which has been somewhat surprised, and pleased, that young people relate to its work so easily. One of Parliament's success stories has been its education service, which finds itself overwhelmed by requests for visits from schools. The task, of course, is to convert this interest to actual participation at election times, for only around 1 in 5 young people actually get round to voting, compared with 4 out 5 people over the age of 65. National IdentityIn terms of how people in Scotland relate their 'national' identity (Scottish) to their 'state' identity (British), there has been a firming up of the former over the last decade or so. Thus, whereas in 1979, 44% said they had more in common with a (same class) English person, and 38% with a different class Scottish person, by 2001, the figures were 25% and 40% respectively. In other words, 'nationality' seems to have become a more salient form of identity than that of social class. In like manner, there has been a shift away from being 'British' to being 'Scottish' (in 1979, 38% gave their 'best choice' identity as British, and 56% Scottish; whereas by 2000, only 13% said they were British first and foremost, and 80% Scottish). To be sure, this somewhat stark choice is not how people do identity politics in Scotland. Thus, on a five-point scale with 'Scottish not British' at one end, and 'British not Scottish' at the other (mid-point is 'equally Scottish and British'), the results over time are as follows: Table 7: National Identity in Scotland
Sources: Scottish Election Surveys, 1992 and 1997(E); These data show that there has been a steady shift towards the 'Scottish' end of the spectrum over the last decade, and while most Scots remain 'British' to a degree, devolution has, to date, had little direct impact on identity politics in Scotland. ConclusionScotland has embarked on something of a political experiment. In the 'marriage of convenience' which was the British Union since 1707, it retained a very high level of institutional autonomy within the unitary state. That state, of course, has become de facto and in an assymetrical way, federal, at least as far as Scotland, and Wales - even Northern Ireland - are concerned. There are simply no easy answers to questions about the future, whether devolution leads to independence (whatever that might mean in the modern world), or whether it ends up as a convenient half-way house for the Scots in the British, and latterly the European, Unions. Making Scotland a better place to live in was always what people in Scotland wanted a parliament to deliver, and they are probably less interested in the constitutional means for bringing that about than politicians. The Scottish Parliament came about because the old, once flexible, arrangements which had worked to Scotland's advantage in the Union had begun to atrophy. The Scottish anomaly - a society with high levels of autonomy but within a unitary state - was always a contradiction which could not hold for ever. We do not of course live on this planet by ourselves. What happens in our little corner of NW Europe is inherently influenced by goings-on elsewhere. As Scots we've always known that, and indeed, played it to our advantage, and no doubt will go on doing so. There are probably low levels of risk that we become insular and parochial, for small countries like ours and those of our Celtic neighbours, constantly look for comparators against which to measure our performance. Scotland is living an experiment which has been informed by learning lessons from other countries where devolved government has a longer pedigree, and which is crucially marked by its long campaign for constitutional change in which notions of absolute sovereignty, of the supremacy of the 'political' over the 'social' were never going to play. The partners in this new Scotland are, in the words, of the Consultative Steering Group, the Government (Executive, if one must), the Parliament, and the People. Only if the new, and future, constitutional arrangements 'make a difference' to people's lives will they have succeeded. There is no other worthwhile game in town.
ReferencesCurtice, J. McCrone, D., Park, A. and Paterson, L (2002) . New Scotland, New Society?, Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh. MacCormick, N. (1998) 'The English Constitution, the British State and the Scottish Anomaly', in Understanding Constitutional Change, special issue of Scottish Affairs. McCrone, D. (2001) Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a nation, London: Routledge. Paterson, L. (1994) The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, Edinburgh University Press. Paterson, L Brown, A. Curtice, J., Hinds, K., McCrone, D., Park, A., Sproston, K., and Surridge, P. (1999) New Scotland; New Politics? Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh.
(Published Online: 8 July 2002)
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