'... I ken, when we had a king, and a chancellor and parliament-men o' our ain, we could aye peeble them wi' stanes when they werena gude bairns - But naebody's nails can reach the length o' Lunnon.' (Walter Scott The Heart of Midlothian )
Walter Scott never knew just how prescient his words would become when he put them in the mouth of Mrs Howden in his 1818 novel barely a century after the Union[2] . While Scottish parliamentarians in 2003 have not exactly been pelted with stones in the Lawnmarket, they have not been showered in bouquets either. Much of this is, in truth, unfair. There has never been a political institution which, in the full glare of publicity, has had to grow up so quickly. Its founding principles: sharing power, accountability, access and participation, and equality of opportunity ensured that it set for itself the stiffest of examinations. There must have been politicians who regretted making the parliament such an open and accessible place, especially in the face of a critical and competitive press. Westminster, with its douce and arcane rules and procedures, seemed light-years removed from those of Holyrood.
The stanes themselves have taken a pounding, as the rising cost of the real Holyrood, the new parliament building, has become the lightning conductor for the ills of the infant institutions. Nothing gets people in pubs going more than the cost of the building, and only a few wiser heads are willing to take the longer view. The message though of this particular debacle is that parliament has to be much more robust and proactive about its very existence. The case for it cannot be allowed to go by default. For a modern institution, for example, it has been woefully unsure of how its actions resonate in the media. It was caught out in its early days on a number of occasions: debating salaries and conditions, awarding medals for a job barely begun (whose bright idea was that, one wonders?), issuing reports without much thought to how they would be received (its report on parliament's founding consultative steering group principles ran to over 2000 pages and was ignored by the media), failing to cash in on anniversaries (1000 days came and went), somehow getting caught up in its own nitty-gritty at a time when the electorate grew more and more lukewarm.
Is all, or even any, of this fair? It's a tough world, and the parliamentary infant has had rough and ready rearing. By and large, though, it didn't do itself many favours. In truth, it suffered from undue expectations. At the time of the 1999 referendum, the electorate expected far too much, and politicians fed their fantasies. It was, after all, a devolved parliament, without control of major economic levers, at a time when politicians across the western world have probably never had less power to influence people's lives and at the same time more is expected of them. Rather than raise their hands to admit: we cannot do very much, and anyway, the issues are far more complex than you, the electorate, seem to think, the easy road has been to promise more and more about less and less. It is, of course, a brave politician who can admit to this, and gey few were as bold to do so.
There is, however, a more fundamental and interesting issue behind the apparent receding popularity of the parliament, and that relates to the 'ownership' of the institution. In short, whose parliament is it anyway? This is a serious question which derives from the long process of Home Rule. The failure of Westminster parties to deliver devolution - and let us remember that a majority voted yes in the 1979 referendum - meant that it was left to 'civil society' to agitate for the parliament. The twenty year campaign since 1979 was waged by a ragbag of campaigners and civil associations from trade unions to churches to women's groups, all directly unelected, but all donning the mantle of speaking for Scotland. Some parliamentarians like to think that as elected representatives, they alone represent the nation, but that is not how the nation sees it. Parliament became the people's forum, on loan to the political class, as long as they treated it, and them, with some respect in the context of the limited nature of politics in the 21st century. Power sharing - between government, parliament and people - is a three-way system, and not the preserve of any single agent. The doctrine of 'popular sovereignty', juxtaposed with the 'crown sovereignty' as practised on the banks of the Thames, may be more of an aspiration than a legal principle, but nonetheless, it gels with the view that politics, and the parliament, isn't everything. Nor is it helped by bizarre observations from the self-styled mother of parliaments that, for example, Edinburgh can have 'parliament' elections, but not 'parliamentary' elections: bring up another bag of chuckies, if you will.
We should remind ourselves that parliament as brickbat reflects how quickly and deeply it has embedded itself in Scottish life. In its short but eventful existence, it has become the institution to be talked about, not always in a complimentary way. In truth, it is a remarkable institution. It is much more representative of Scottish society than one could have imagined; it has one of the highest proportions of women members in the western world; it has a multi-party system which places it in the mainstream of European politics: a social democratic party, a regionalist/nationalist one, a centre Liberal party, a right of centre Conservative party, a socialist one, and a Green. It has a coalition government which avoids the notorious elective dictatorships which Westminster usually produces. The Executive has made tentative steps to connect Scotland more firmly into the wider world. Henry McLeish signed the Flanders Declaration in May 2001 with six other self-governing 'constitutional regions' within the EU. A year later, the Executive signed a Protocol of Cooperation with the Government of Catalonia. In February 2003, a 3rd regional partnership agreement was signed with North-Rhine Westphalia.
Despite having limited powers, the parliament has carved out distinctive policies: abolishing upfront tuition fees for students, introducing free personal care for the elderly, repealing section 2a (28), passing land reform legislation, along with some 62 bills passed in the first session of parliament. Of these, 50 were Executive bills, 8 were Member's Bills, 3 Committee Bills, and 1 was a Private Bill. Some of the notable ones were: National Parks Bill, Abolition of Poindings and Warrant Sales Bill (introduced by Tommy Sheridan), Education (Graduate Endowment and Student Support) Bill, Water Industry Bill, Community Care and Health Bill, Protection of Wild Mammals Bill, Freedom of Information Bill, Land Reform Bill, Criminal Justice Bill, Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Bill[3] . Much of this legislative programme represented catch-up because Scottish legislation at Westminster was frequently squeezed out of the timetable, but it did not stop some complaining that there should have been more to the new Scotland than passing legislation; perhaps a case of being damned if you do, and damned if you don't.
Many parliamentarians found it irksome that the electorate failed to distinguish between the government (Executive) and the parliament, and that too much of parliamentary time was devoted to government business. Possibly that is the nature of modern parliamentary democracies. Some, outwith parliament, and possibly a little naively, were taken aback at how 'political' it all had become, given the promises of a 'new' Scotland, and even some members of the Consultative Steering Group (CSG) which had evolved the founding principles of the parliament were disappointed. There was, to be sure, always going to be a tension between participatory democracy, which had done so much to usher in the new politics, and older-style representative democracy with its closed system and reverberative traditions. Much of the flavour of change, even chaos, was aided by the loss of two First Ministers. The sad loss of Donald Dewar deprived Scotland of a politician who genuinely enjoyed debate and flyting, and his stature and quirky qualities were sorely missed. Henry McLeish fell under a cloud, mainly of his own making, and Jack McConnell made Harold Macmillan's night of the long knives seem like a tea party, when he cleared away former ministers. The overall effect was to heighten the sense of political intrigue but perhaps not to foster the impression of carefully thought out strategy. The febrile atmosphere was driven by an over-excited press intent on dishing its competitors in a crowded Scottish market than by careful reporting of developing politics. The painstaking work of committees was usually ignored by newspapers in favour of gossip and tittle-tattle based on who's in and who's out of political favour. Only measured reportage by the broadcasting media, and above all, the BBC could be counted upon to tell it more or less like it is.
What do people think of it so far?
In this context it was easy to assume that the Scottish electorate had been thoroughly scunnered by the whole enterprise, and certainly that was the impression given by the media. It certainly wasn't as simple as that. We have been fortunate in recent years to have a number of quality social and political surveys which allow us a more measured examination of public opinion. Let us explore the key ones.
The first table looks at people's constitutional preferences since 1999, and shows that the current system of devolution, an elected parliament with taxation powers, remains the settled will. Those wishing to turn the clock back to pre-devolutionary days number only one in ten of those surveyed, and clearly there has been no return to the status quo ante.
Table 1: Constitutional Preferences, 1999-2002
1999
2000
2001
2002
Independent from UK and EU
10
11
9
11
Independent from UK within EU
18
19
18
18
Elected Parliament with taxation powers
50
47
54
43
Elected Parliament without taxation powers
8
8
6
8
No elected parliament
10
12
9
12
base
1482
1663
1605
1665
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, 1999 -2002
Much has also been made of the putative English backlash to devolution in Scotland (and Wales), but once again, there is little evidence for such claims. Taking the different surveys in England and Scotland at their proximate years (1999 and 2000 respectively), we find virtual agreement north and south of the border as regards the preferred outcome for Scotland. There is no evidence that people in England either want full independence for Scotland or to return to the situation of no elected parliament.
Table 2: Constitutional Preferences in England and Scotland
English respondents 1999
Scottish respondents 2000
Scotland should be:
Independent from UK and EU
8%
11%
Independent from UK within EU
16
19
Parliament with taxation powers
44
47
Parliament: no taxation powers
10
8
No elected parliament
13
12
Sources: for English respondents, British Social Attitudes, 1999; for Scottish respondents, Scottish Social Attitudes, 2000.
On the other hand, there has been some tailing off from the high levels of optimism at the time of the opening of the parliament such that the percentage agreeing that it would give (or has given) people more say in Scotland's governance has halved, as has the percentage believing it would improve educational standards. On the other hand, the modal positions in both cases are to the effect that it has made no difference either way, rather than that it has made matters worse.
Table 3: Democratic effectiveness and the Scottish Parliament
% agreeing that Scottish Parliament will/has:
1999
2000
2001
2002
Give ordinary people more say in how Scotland is governed
64
44
38
31
Increase standard of education in Scotland
56
43
27
25
Improve Scotland's economy
43
36
43
N/A
Improve NHS in Scotland
49
N/A
45
N/A
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, 1999-2002
That 'realism' has set in is reflected in the trends shown in table 4, whereby most people locate the more influential level of government at Westminster. While two-thirds think Westminster is more influential, fully 72% think that Holyrood ought to be more influential, suggesting that the Scottish electorate is more than capable of distinguishing between reality and aspiration.
Table 4: Institution with most influence over the way Scotland is run
1999
2000
2001
2002
Scottish Parliament
41
13
15
13
UK government at Westminster
39
66
66
66
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, 1999-2002
This is confirmed by table 5 which supports the view that there is a consistent differential when it comes to which level of government people in Scotland trust to look after the country's interests. Even though there has been a falling away in support for both institutions, almost three times as many people in Scotland trust the parliament over the UK government to represent Scotland's interests.
Table 5: Trust in Scottish Parliament or UK government to represent Scotland's interests
1999
2000
2001
2002
Scottish parliament
81
53
65
53
UK government
32
18
22
20
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, 1999-2002
Finally, it appears that discontent with the Scottish parliament takes the form of thinking it should have more powers rather than fewer (the question was not asked in the 2002 survey).
Table 6: The Scottish parliament should be given more powers
1999
2000
2001
Agree strongly
14
23
20
Agree
42
43
48
Neither
20
15
14
Disagree
18
12
12
Disagree Strongly
4
5
4
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, 1999-2001
All in all, it is difficult to sustain the view that the electorate is disillusioned. They may be critical of its practitioners and their practices, but the Scottish parliament scores much higher than the British parliament, and there is very little demand to turn the clock back. Perhaps the media should get out more.
Predicting the election
Let us take the long view. If we explore the monthly opinion polls carried out for The Herald newspaper in the first session of the parliament, we find broad consistencies in trends.
source: NFO System Three monthly polls for The Herald
source: NFO System Three monthly polls for The Herald
Labour had been comfortably ahead of its main challengers, the SNP, for virtually the whole period with the exception of the middle months of 2000. The period coincided with the stushie about Section 2a, the sudden death of Donald Dewar in the autumn of 2000, and the fuel protests in November which lifted the SNP to its highest poll position (42%) in the whole session. Thereafter, Labour was ahead of its rivals by between 5 and 10 percentage points on the first vote until the early months of 2003 at the outbreak of the 2nd Gulf war and, by April 2003, Labour and the SNP were neck and neck. Across the period 1999-2003, Labour's median poll rating on the first vote was 39% and the SNP's 32%, which is a fair reflection of the gap between the two parties over the long duration.
While the gap between Labour and the SNP on the 2nd vote is much narrower - 32% to 31% respectively - Labour's hold over the constituency seats is such that the SNP would have to be 3 or 4 percentage points ahead of their rivals on the first vote to hold out any chance of being the largest party in the parliament. That is why Labour would still be largest party (with 46 seats, 8 more than the SNP) if the April 2003 poll was translated into the actual result. The SNP's share of the second vote has been remarkably stable over the period. Forty of the 47 polls (85%) have given them between 28% and 33% of the vote-share on the second vote (Labour's share was also stable, with 31 out of 47 polls giving them between 29% and 33% of the second vote). The electoral system is, let us remember, designed to reinforce stability such that parties which win on the constituency swings lose on the list roundabouts. Labour, after all, won 43% of seats in 1999 on the back of 38% and 28% of constituency and list votes respectively, which is why some, such as presiding officer David Steel, argued for a purer system of PR such as the single transferable vote (STV). Nevertheless, even Labour's significant win in 1999 where they outpolled the SNP by 10 percentage points on the first vote, and by over 5 percentage points on the second, coupled with an inherent benefit in terms of seats from the electoral system, did not give them an overall majority.
The other notable features of the polls since 1999 have been (a) the flat-lining of the Conservative vote (a median of 11% on vote 1 and 10% on vote 2); and (b) the emergence of the Liberal-Democrats as the 3rd party of Scottish politics (12% on vote 1, and 15% on vote 2). The Lib-Dems were polling on a par with the Tories until mid-2001, when they emerged as the clear third party. In similar vein, the minor parties, notably the Scottish Socialist Party, began to make significant showings in the second vote such that from mid-2002, the minor parties began to cumulate an average of 15% between them. What the rise of the Lib-Dems and of the minor parties suggests is that the SNP is able to maintain its challenge to Labour, but not to garner the non-Labour vote which is increasingly spread among its coalition partner, the Liberal-Democrats, to its Right, and the Socialists to its Left.
The success of the minor parties has possibly had the effect of ushering in an era of what we might call 'micro-parties', standing on quite narrow tickets: there is now a right-wing Scottish People's Alliance, a fishermen's party, a pensioners' party, an anti-parking party, anti-hospital closures candidates, to say nothing of Dennis and Margo. Given the unknown impact of war with Iraq in the midst of all this, few can predict with much certainty that they know what will happen. On the basis of the April poll, Labour would have 46 seats (down 10), SNP, 38 (up 3), LibDems 23 (up 6), suggesting that the continuation of the current Labour-Lib-Dem coalition is likely but calibrated somewhat differently. There is perhaps a deeper truth hidden in this prediction, namely, that Scotland may be well and truly in a system of multi-party politics. This may seem an obvious thing to say, but one senses that the main parties still have to come to terms with it. Thus, Labour acts at times as if it has a mandate on its own, or, grudgingly, that the Lib-Dems are simply part of 'greater Labour'. Changing the ratio of Labour to Lib-Dem MSPs from 3:1 to 2:1 would significantly change the culture of coalition government. The SNP too has a tendency to assume that it is the government in waiting, with, apparently, not much thought being given to how to form a coalition government, and with whom.
One of the most significant electoral trends of the last couple of years is the relative failure of the SNP to cash in on Labour's unpopularity. A simple statistic makes this plain: in 1999, Labour and the SNP won around two-thirds of the first vote between them (and 61% of the second). On latest predictions, the two parties would win just over 60% and 55% respectively. In other words, fully 4 out of 10, and 5 out of 10 of people likely to vote (and remember that only 50% of the electorate is likely to vote in this election on current predictions) are going to be voting for one of the other parties, with 2 in 10 voting 'other' - SSP, Green or Independent - on the second vote. Put another way, barely 3 out of 10 Scots are likely to turnout to vote for one or other of the two main parties. That is a humbling message for our politicians, underpinned as it is by an electorate not awfully enamoured of party politics. Scotland has inherited a political system which is still thirled to the old culture of two-party politics, and premised on the assumption that politics matters to most people. Frankly, it doesn't. Radical thinking is needed if Scotland's politicians are to convince its people that they can make a difference, and this is not likely to be achieved either by promising the moon, or by reducing politics to an obsession with key performance indicators (KPI). KPI-ism is no substitute for the vision-thing nor connecting with key values.
Is this likely to happen? There are some optimistic straws in the wind. The parliament will have grown up a bit, no longer in the nursery, and beginning to be a bit more self-confident. It will have a new home at the bottom of the Royal Mile, and it will be that bit harder for the critics to say that they didn't want to be there in the first place. After all, the anti-Holyrood party ('Follywood'), the Conservatives, have hardly benefited electorally from their stance. Much has been made of the fact that many of the MSPs who will be returned on May 1st will have been there before. Familiar faces have the capacity to be more experienced, and no longer neophytes. A more competitive party system with a smaller Labour group in relation to the other parties will require nettles - even thistles - to be grasped, notably introducing PR for local government. A buoyant group of LibDems will not countenance obfuscation this time around. With a backlog of legislation taken care of in the first session, there ought to be more time for focusing on the middle distance and on tackling some of Scotland's longer-term problems such as economic growth and health. There are likely to be opportunities to build firmer bridges with other strong nations and regions of the EU such as Catalonia, Euskadi, Flanders and the German línder, especially important in the light of EU enlargement involving smaller and less economically significant states in the East. We might also be seeing the beginnings of new political blocs: a social-liberal one (if the present coalition holds), and a rainbow coalition of Independentists involving Nationalists, Greens and Socialists.
Scots may indeed be, in the words of Walter Scott's character Miss Grizzel Dalmahoy "weary on Lunnon, and a'that e'er came out o't!", but they want more from their parliament, and expect their politicians to deliver this time around.
[1] I am grateful to Paddy Bort and to Lindsay Paterson for their advice and collegiality in writing this piece.
[2] Mrs Howden was complaining to her neighbour Mr Plumdamas after the King's consort, Queen Caroline, in London had granted an unexpected stay of execution to Captain Porteous whose soldiers had fired on the Edinburgh mob.
[3] The Scottish Parliament website (http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/) has produced a useful summary of all bills passed in the first session of parliament (SP Paper 846, Session 1 (2003)).
(Published Online: 8 April 2003)
This page was published on 7 May 2008